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Since the year 2000, Switzerland has had a totally revised constitution. The main changes deal with
issues of federalism. Globalization has and will have strong centralizing effects, although localization
might trigger emotional and nationalistic reactions within the different ethnic communities of Switzerland.
The growing mobility of people and the important percentage of foreigners living in Switzerland (20
percent) are additional challenges to the already existing but constitutionally provided diversity. This
article explains the new constitution within this framework of the modem world. In particular, it focuses
on the specificity of Swiss diversity and the new balance between self-rule and shared rule.
Switzerland is a small country of 7 million inhabitants surrounded by
Germany, France, Italy, Austria, and the principality of Liechtenstein.
Although the first development of small local state units seeking
independence from foreign kingdoms dates back to the twelfth century,
modern Switzerland was constituted out of 25 sovereign cantons (including
six half-cantons) with the first Federal Constitution of 1848.' The twenty-
sixth canton (Jura) was constituted more recently by separation from the
Canton of Berne at the end of the 1970s. Seventeen cantons are German-
speaking,2 four cantons are French-speaking,3 one canton is Italian-
speaking,4 three cantons are bilingual (German and French),5 and one
canton has three languages (German, Romansh, and Italian).5 In 1874,
there was a general constitutional revision approved by the majority of the
voters and the majority of the cantons adopting a new constitution. This
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constitution remained in force until 1999, although it was modified by
approximately 140 amendments.
A new Constitution was introduced on 1 January 2000. The new federal
Constitution did not radically change the political system, but with regard
to federalism, it includes important new provisions, which may be the
beginning of new federal developments in Switzerland. This article deals
with this new Constitution. The Constitution was drafted after several failures
to modify the old Constitution more radically. Thus, the aim of the founders
of the new Constitution was to modernize the old Constitution without
making major changes in the system.
Currently, Switzerland faces three important challenges: globalization
and European integration, privatization and growing public debts on all
levels, and migration. Twenty percent of the people living in Switzerland
are foreigners. Switzerland has by far the highest percentage of foreigners
per capita and the highest percentage of asylum seekers compared to all
other European countries. All these challenges will have important effects
on Swiss federalism. A major question is whether the new Constitution will
empower Switzerland to face those challenges with flexible, innovative, and
federalist policies.
FEDERALISM AS A PRE-CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE
Diversity
Swiss federalism has developed out of several different, independent,
and very diverse communities, which had been structured as rural
corporations, small democracies, or aristocratic or economic oligarchies.
These small corporations loosened their ties and finally seceded from their
big neighboring empires, kingdoms, or nations. Thus, they were not
integrated into the nation-building process of Europe in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. On the contrary, they formed their own
governmental system and constituted a state composed of different sovereign
cantons, that is, of very diverse political units, different language
communities, and different religions. The main purpose of the alliance
(Bund), which later developed into a federal state, was to rule the political
affairs of the cantons and of the alliance independently and according to
their own values of democracy.
This policy was the reason that at the edge of the three big language
groups of Western Europe (German, French, and Italian), some 25
democratic corporations could unite in an alliance around the Alps. In
1848, this alliance was transformed after a short civil war (Sonderbundskrieg)
in 1847 into a federal state with a federal constitution. The federation is
still called the Swiss Confederation for several reasons-in particular, because
the German name (SchweizerischeEidgenossenschaft) cannot be translated into
Swiss Federalism 99
French and Italian. The very legitimacy of this unit is based on the
constitutional autonomy of the cantons (self-rule) and on their constitution-
making power at the federal level (shared-rule). The Swiss Confederation
exists through and by the will of the cantons.
Each of the cantonal democratic communities could thus live and develop
according to its own culture, history, language, and religion. Each canton
acknowledged the legal culture of its neighbors but established its own
perception of the state, law, democracy, and even state-church relations.
They retained their own perception of a cantonal nationhood and state
legitimacy. In turn, they maintained their own cantonal and even municipal
citizenship. Thus, to the present day, every Swiss has a three-fold citizenship:
municipal, cantonal, and federal (Art. 37, par. 1).
The alliance and later the federal state maintained their independence
in relation to their big and powerful European neighbors. They did this to
protect their own interests and to build up their joint nationhood.
Nevertheless, the cantons and, in particular, those at the borders of
Switzerland did maintain their cultural relationship toward their big
neighbors. Thus, the Swiss citizens had, and still have, a double loyalty.
Politically, they are loyal to their own state; culturally, they feel a connection
to the culture of the relevant big neighboring nation.
The cantons and the Swiss Federation have thus adapted in a very diverse
manner to modern constitutionalism, while also maintaining their
corporativism in a rural environment and culture.7 According to the Swiss
Constitution's preamble, they did not adopt the melting-pot solution of
"We the people of..." (cf., the United States Constitution). On the contrary,
they decided to remain a composed nation and adopted in Article 1 of the
1874 Constitution the following formula:
Together, the peoples of the 23 sovereign Cantons of Switzerland united
by the present alliance, namely: Zurich, Bern, Lucerne,... and Jura, form
the Swiss Confederation.
Up to the end of the nineteenth century, the causes of conflict in
Switzerland were much more religious, between Protestants (55 percent)
and Catholics (44 percent), than cultural between the different language
groups. This changed radically in the twentieth century. Today, religion as
a cause of conflict is fading away. Much more important is the language
issue. Democratic decisions of the people by referendum show, for instance,
7See Karl W. Deutsch, Die Schweiz als ein paradigmatischer Fall poLHischer Integration (Berne: P. Haupt,
1976), p. 21. For a concise historical analysis, see Alfred Kolz, "Geschichtliche Grundlagen," Verfassungsrecht
der Schweiz, eds. Aubert, Muller, and Thurer, pp. 111-127. For diversity as fundamental value see also
Thomas Fleiner, "Legal Instruments and Procedures to Prevent and Solve Ethnic Conflicts," Federalism
and Multiethnic Stales, eds. Bast a Fleiner and Fleiner, p. 156; Rhinow, Die Bundesverfassung 2000, p. 70 and
RainerJ. Schweizer, "Homogenitat und Vielfalt im schweizerischen Staatsrecht," Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz,
eds. Aubert, Muller, and Thurer, pp. 161-163. For communal civism as the "essence of Swiss polity" see
Lidija Bast a Fleiner, "Minority and Legitimacy of a Federal Slate: An Outsider Perception of the Swiss
Model," Federalism and Multiethnic Slates, eds. Basta Fleiner and Fleiner, p. 77.
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that language groups have very different opinions on foreign policy, European
integration, social security, and the environment. If in the next few years the
gap between the language communities becomes larger and deeper, one
can foresee important conflicts between the different communities.
Taking into account these emerging new tensions among different
linguistic communities, the new Swiss Constitution emphasizes the obligation
of the federation to enhance peace and understanding among the different
linguistic communities. As did the previous constitution, the new
Constitution declares all four languages, namely, German (63.7 percent),
French (19.2 percent), Italian (7.6 percent), and Romansh (0.6 percent)
as official languages of the country (Art. 4). The three main languages
(German, French, and Italian) are on equal footing. In the case of the
Romansh language, Article 70 of the Swiss Constitution provides only the
guarantee for the Romansh-speaking citizens to have their official contact
with the federal administration in their own language.
With regard to the other three official languages, they are legally respected
with a constitutionally guaranteed equal value, which has far-reaching
practical consequences.8 For instance, all official decisions, in particular all
legislation (bills, statutes, and ordinances), must be translated into the three
languages. Bills, statutes, ordinances, and the like are only valid if they are
published at the same time in the three official languages. Each text and
wording has equal value with regard to interpretation. No language has
priority; every language has the same original priority. In case of conflict, a
judge has to decide according to the most reasonable interpretation, not
according to the language in which the statute has been drafted.
The principle of freedom of language is very controversial.9 Two main
principles conflict. Those who advocate the protection of minority languages
feel threatened by the majority. They try to defend their language territory
by invoking the collective right of the language group within its own territory
to impose the language of the territory. This conflicts with the principle of
an individual right to language. In fact, the new Constitution provides a
compromise on this issue. Article 18 guarantees freedom of language as
one of the fundamental individual liberties. At the same time, Article 70,
par. 2, stipulates that every canton shall designate its official language. In
doing so, the cantons shall, in order to preserve harmony between linguistic
communities, "respect the traditional territorial distribution of languages
and take into account the indigenous linguistic minorities." In a conflict
8See Fleiner, "Legal Instruments and Procedures to Preventand Solve Ethnic Conflicts," p. 126; Marco
Borghi, "Langues nationales et langues officielles," Verfassungsrecht der Schiveiz, eds. Aubert, Muller, and
Thurer, pp. 593-606; Auer, Malinverni, and Hottelier, Droil constitutionnel suisse, p. 28; Rhinow, Die
Bundesverfassung 2000, p. 71.
"See Marco Borghi, "La liberte de la langue et ses limites," Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, eds. Aubert,
Muller, and Thurer, pp. 607-618. The problem of languages of education is broadly discussed in Thomas
Fleiner, Peter H. Nelde, and Joseph-G. Turi, eds., IMW and Language(s) of Education (Basle/Geneva/Munich:
Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2001).
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between the individual right for language and the collective right of the
community to defend its language territory, the collective right wins, if it is
for the sake of harmony and peace.
Peace among language groups is also referred to in Art. 70, par. 3, which
requires the federal and cantonal authorities to "encourage mutual
understanding and exchange between the linguistic communities."
Muldculturalism, diversity, and complexity have often been shaped out
of brutal religious wars and ideological controversies that in the past risked
breaking the country into pieces. Switzerland thus remains a composed
nation with an important potential for conflicts. However, there is today,
certainly, a large consensus that minority interests should not be pursued
with violence but rather by peaceful political means. What are the reasons
that make all the different communities renounce violence and accept
peaceful decision-making processes? The basic reason is to be found in the
legitimacy of the unity of the nation. But as the nation is not ethnically
homogeneous, the only factor that does unify the country is a shared
commitment to the same political values and the internalized acceptance
of the rules of the game of a corporate local and federal consensus
democracy. Such a general acceptance, however, cannot be based solely on
specific principles of shared rule; it depends just as much on the self-rule
principle, that is, on the autonomy of cantons and municipalities.
The characteristics of the new Constitution will in fact put more emphasis
on the principle of shared rule than on the principle of self-rule as expressed
by the autonomy of the cantons. It provides in particular more possibilities
for cantonal governments to participate in executive decisions on the federal
level (Art. 45, Art. 55, the Statute on the Participation of Cantonal
Governments on the decision-making process in international affairs and
the growing power of the Conference of the Presidents of Cantonal
Executives).
The most provoking challenge of Swiss federalism is its multiculturalism.
This multiculturalism is not the outcome of immigration as in such federal
countries as the United States, Canada, and Australia. Multiculturalism
has its roots in the ancient history of communities that have always lived in
Switzerland. The as yet not fully solved challenge in immigration countries
with regard to their indigenous populations is more comparable to the
multiculturalism that European countries such as Switzerland have to cope
with. The major and most challenging question thus is: how can so diverse
a society as the Swiss community, which is not homogeneous like Germany,
find its unity and legitimacy in common political values? How can the
exclusive political values of local democracy and federalism, which are not
universal and inclusive, enable a composed people to be united within a
European environment, which today bases political unity on universal values
such as democracy, the rule of law, and human rights?
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This challenge becomes even more worrying in our times.10 Both
European integration and globalization trigger emotional counter-reactions
in the form of nationalism and ethnic conflicts in local areas. Financial
constraints for local authorities require centralization by either
"supracantonal" cooperation or mergers of cantons or municipalities. The
emotions of the citizens, on the other hand, lead to pressures for more
autonomy and, in some cases, even secession. The question, then, is whether
the Swiss, belonging to their different cultures, will be able in a future united
Europe or united world to identify themselves as a people united by the
same political beliefs and political culture.
The state of modern times has derived its legitimacy either as a state
created by the nation or from a pre-constitutional ethnically homogeneous
people.11 In the former, the "nation" has been "constituted" by the state,
that is, by the citizens (citoyens) of the state territory accepting the universal
values promoted by the constitution (e.g., the French case). In the latter,
the state can be created-as in the German case-by an ethnically
homogeneous people. According to this latter understanding, the ethnically
homogeneous people are united by nature, that is, by common history,
tradition, culture, language, or religion. This unity by nature "produces"
the right of self-determination. The preamble of the German constitution
thus stipulates: "the German People have adopted, by virtue of their
constituent power, this Constitution." Between these two poles of its
neighbor countries, France and Germany, Switzerland was able to establish
its own concept of a composed nation based on a social compact to establish
cantonal authority and a federal alliance to establish federal authority.12
Although the Swiss Constitution of 1874 explicitly stated that the people
of the different sovereign cantons form the federation, the new Constitution
does base its legitimacy on both the Swiss nation and on the peoples of the
cantons.13 Here the question remains as to whether the people of Switzerland
is a unity and, if so, what is the basis of this unity? It can well be that the
traditional political procedures and institutions, such as direct democracy,
federalism, and autonomy of local authorities, have been so strongly
internalized that they have turned a culturally diverse population into a
politically homogeneous people. It may well be that federalism, which has
combined the shared power of the different cultures with the strong
autonomy of cantons and municipalities, has been and still is the most
'"See Peter Pernthaler, "Die Globalisiemng als Herausforderung an eine moderne Staatslehre," in: FS
KOJA, (Vienna, 1998), p. 85; Daniel Thurer, "Recht der internationalen Gemeinschaft und Wandel der
Staatlichkeit," Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, eds. Aubert, Miiller, and Thurer, pp. 37-61.
"See Thomas Fleiner and Lidija Basta Fleiner, "Federalism, Federal States and Decentralization,"
Federalism and Multiethnic States, eds. Basta Fleiner and Fleiner, p. 8.
l2See Basta Fleiner, "Minority and Legitimacy of a Federal State: An Outsider Perception of the Swiss
Model," p. 77.
'
3Rhinow, Die Bundesverfassung 2000, p. 68; Anton Greber, "Die strukturellen Grundlagen des
schweizerischen Bundesstaats," Constitution 2000, eds. Thomas Fleiner et al. (Basle/Geneva/Munich:
Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2000), p. 7.
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important integrative factor in the reality of the Swiss population. It is
certainly thanks to these common political values that Switzerland up to
now has not been split up into separate language and/or religious
communities.
Thus, the legitimacy of the Swiss Confederation is based on the peoples
of the cantons as well as on a "Swiss nation" composed of different cultures
and religions. This nation is fragmented by the cantons, which represent
the political units of the federation. The peoples in the cantons are
politically committed to their respective cantons and to the federation, but
culturally they are also linked to the strong culture of the related people in
their respective neighbor countries. The unity of the state thus is based on
the common understanding and on the common perception of these
fundamentals of Swiss politics. This historical reality ultimately shapes the
federal structure of the federation. If the Constitution did not take this
reality into account, the Confederation would ultimately split into the
different ethnic communities.14
It is this reality of the fragmented Swiss society that induced the drafters
of the new Constitution to provide in the preamble a clear mandate for the
Confederation to be "determined to live our diversity in unity respecting
one another." Article 2, par. 2, of the Constitution obliges the Confederation
to foster the cultural diversity of the federation. Such a provision is unique
compared with other constitutions. The United States Constitution is based
on the melting pot concept in referring to "We, the people of the United
States." The South African Constitution also stipulates unity by diversity,
but taking into account the wounds of history, it professes to heal the
divisions of the past.
The paradoxical formula of "diversity in unity" (preamble) describes the
federal principle according to the Swiss understanding of its multicultural
reality. Diversity in unity is the starting point of different theories on
federalism.15 It not only emphasizes that different cultural communities can
be united by their firm will to be a political union, but it expresses also the
dialectic tension between self-rule, shared rule, and solidarity. Federalism as
a structural principle depends on the constitutionally established and
protected balance between self-rule and shared rule.16 All measures of the
federal government and, in particular, federal statutes have to respect this
balance in order to accomplish the mandates of the constitution.
The constitutional powers of the federal and cantonal authorities are
separated and divided according to the federal Constitution (Article 3). In
"Peter Saladin, "Commentary ad Article 3 (Constitution 1874)," Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung der
Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft vom 29. Mai 1874, eds. Jean-Francois Aubert et al. (Basle/Zurich/Berne:
Helbing& Lichtenhahn/Stampfli/Schulthess, 1987-1996), pp. 6-7.
l5See Thomas StaufTer and Nicole Topperwien, "Balancing Self-Rule and Shared Rule," Federalism and
Multiethnic States, eds. Basta Fleiner and Fleiner, p. 41; Anton Greber, "Die vorpositiven Grundlagen des
Bundesstaates" (diss., Fribourg University, 1999).
16DanielJ. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987), p. 5.
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practice, they are redefined in a complex network, which can only function
in a spirit of comity and federal-cantonal partnership. Swiss federalism
thus is not simply a complementary instrument for an additional separation
of powers in order to limit state powers by vertical checks and balances.17
The multicultural diversity of Swiss society is the pre-constitutional reality
reflected in Swiss federalism. Thus, federalism is the fundamental principle
underling the legitimacy of the Constitution.18
PEACE AND LIBERTY
Balance Between Individual and Collective Rights. The primary aim of the
modern liberal state is individual liberty, that is, the protection and
promotion of fundamental rights and values. A multicultural state such as
Switzerland, which is confronted with a high potential for internal conflicts,
has not only to be concerned about individual liberty but also to safeguard
peace and harmony among the different communities. In fact, it has to
manage and enhance peace not only between individuals, but just as much
between the different communities. One of the most important aims of
Swiss federalism, thus, is to guarantee, apart from individual liberty, the
multiculturalism of its diverse communities.
In order to respond to these necessities, the federal Constitution has
established political institutions and procedures that facilitate peaceful
settlements or management of internal conflicts. In this sense, the preamble
to the new Constitution explicitly resolves to "strengthen liberty, democracy,
independence and peace (not only international) in solidarity and in
openness to the world." Thus, not only liberty but also peace among the
cultural communities are among the declared aims of the Constitution. In
fact, during Swiss history, individual liberty has often been restricted for the
sake of peace among the cultural and linguistic communities. Religious
and language communities have always claimed their rights under the title
of collective rights, which in certain cases restrict individual liberties whenever
they felt threatened by other more numerous or more powerful communities.
Liberty of Religion and Peace among Religious Communities. With regard to
the liberty of religion (Article 15), the federal Court has not only taken
into account individual freedom as a fundamental right, it has respected
just as much religious peace as a main purpose of the federation. The
Court, therefore, has based its decisions not explicitly but implicitly on the
collective right of religious communities to pursue among the communities
within their traditional territories the interest of the majority religion.19
"See Hansjorg Seiler, Cewaltentdlung (Berne: Stampfli, 1994), p. 130.
'"Walter Kagi, "Die Grundordnung unseres Kleinstaates und ihre Herausforderung in der zweiten
Halfte des 2O.Jahrhunderts," Festschrift SchwetLerischerJuristenverein (Basle, 1964), p. 16; Philippe Mastronardi,
"Strukturprinzipien der Bundesverfassung?" Beihefte zur Zeilschrift fur Schweizerisches Recht (ZSR) 7 (Basle/
Frankfurt a. M., 1988), pp. 28, 37. The federal principle is, however, endangered. See Hafelin and
Haller, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrechl, p. 54.
"Seejorg Paul Muller, GrundrechUin der Schweiz, 3rd ed. (Berne: Stampfli, 1999), p. 80.
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Today, religion as a potential cause of conflict in Switzerland is fading away.
Nonedieless, Article 72, par. 2 empowers the federal and cantonal authorities
explicitly to take necessary measures to maintain public peace among the
different religious communities.
Liberty of Language and Principle of Territoriality. Although the peril of
religious conflict no longer looms in Switzerland, religious and language
conflicts have risen all over the globe and turned into the most dangerous
conflicts threatening world peace. However, the tensions among language
groups have remained in Switzerland. Such tensions have even increased
during recent decades. Consequently, the new Constitution (Article 70)
confers the explicit burden and responsibility on the federal and cantonal
authorities to seek harmony among the different language communities.
This is a particular burden for bilingual or even multilingual cantons. Three
cantons are bilingual (French/German: Valais, Fribourg, and Bern), and
one canton is trilingual (German, Italian, Romansh: Grison/Graubunden).
The canton of the Tessin is only Italian-speaking, but it has a small German-
speaking municipality (Bosco Gurin). Harmony and peace between
language communities is not only an issue between cantons, it is also an
issue of intracantonal harmony in these cases.
The contradictory wording of the Constitution between the individual
right to language (Article 18) and the collective right of minority territories
to protect their language (Article 70) has already been mentioned. They
will need a quite innovative interpretation by the federal Court.20
Constitutional Procedure for the Solution of Territorial Conflicts. The
Constitution of 1848 was been drafted in the aftermath of the civil war in
1847 between the Roman Catholic conservative cantons and the Protestant
liberal cantons. The Catholics were linked to the Catholic monarchies.
The Protestant liberal cantons were under the influence of the French
Revolution and were promoting a liberal constitution reflecting the universal
values of the declaration of human rights. The Catholic cantons established
a specific alliance (Sonderbund) in order either to defeat the liberal
Protestants or to secede from a liberal democratic Switzerland. The
Catholics wanted to restore Switzerland to the ancient aristocratic times of
the eighteenth century. The liberals wanted to constitute a new modern
unitary state incorporating governmental branches with separated and
limited powers in order to protect individual rights. In the so-called war of
the Sonderbund, the Catholics were defeated and the liberals were able to
establish a constitution according to their conception of Switzerland.
However, the sense of compromise established through preceding
centuries of conflicts and confederal relationships and the desire for
partnership prevailed. It enabled the founding fathers of the new federal
state to respect the interests of the conservatives by providing strong cantonal
^Ibid., 140.
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autonomy and a role in shared rule based on the concept of the equal
sovereign rights of the cantons. This respect for the equal sovereign rights
of the cantons as federal units did have and still has far-reaching
consequences because the size in population and territory of the cantons is
very different. The "asymmetry" between the large and the small cantons is
unusually big. This has as the effect, for instance, that in a constitutional
referendum, the vote of a citizen of the half-canton of Appenzell (which
counts only as a half-cantonal vote) has a value 37 times higher than the
vote of a citizen of the most populated canton, Zurich.
The conservative cantons for their part accepted some liberal
constitutional rights and the prohibition of any political alliance among
particular groups of cantons. As certain borderlines between some cantons
have often been disputed, with the risk of open conflict, the constitutions
of 1848 and 1874, in the interests of intercantonal peace, considered the
territories of the cantons as "sacred," and thus did not foresee any territorial
change among the cantons. On the contrary, for the sake of peace among
the cantons, the Constitution obliged the federal authorities to protect and
to guarantee the territories of the cantons.
Nevertheless, the most important dispute on territory to arise
subsequently, that concerning the Jura region of the Canton of Berne, could
not be settled by such an explicit lack of regulation. The rigorous freezing
of cantonal territories could not provide a final solution. This policy did
not prevent the people of the French-speaking part of the Canton of Berne
living in its northern part, which was the historic region of the Jura, from
seeking secession from the German-speaking Canton of Berne. The dispute
lasted for more than a century.
Finally, without any specific provision in the federal Constitution, the
Canton of Berne decided, empowered by its own residual power, to grant
the right of self-determination to the people living in thejura area. However,
while this right was provided for the region as a whole, at the same time the
right of self-determination was given to every district and, in certain cases,
even to the municipalities. If die region favored secession, die smaller districts
and, in some instances, even the municipalities could decide whether they
would prefer to remain in the Canton of Berne or to join the new Canton of
Jura. This cascade of different referendum votes allowed both cantons to
reshape the borderlines not only along the language border but also along
the religious division between French-speaking Protestants and French-
speaking Catholics living in thejura region of the Canton of Berne.
If the right to self-determination had been given only to the territory of
the region as a whole, die conflict could not have been setded democratically.
A vote based on a simple-majority principle with consequence for the entire
region would have been a major cause for unsolvable conflicts.21
21For an analysis of general problems of ethnic conflicts and the experiences of the Swiss Constitution,
see Fleiner, "Legal Instruments and Procedures to Prevent and Solve Ethnic Conflicts," p. 145.
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Thus, the pragmatic (although sometimes very painful) procedure of
the secession of the Canton of Jura from Berne respected the following
principles:22
1. All parties accepted a procedure based on a common consensus.
The idea of a unilateral secession was never realistically invoked.
The final decision of a new canton required first, the
constitutional amendment of the Canton of Berne accepted in
a popular referendum, second, a vote of the people living in the
area of the Jura region, third, the acceptance of the districts,
fourth, the decisions of the municipalities, and fifth, the
agreement of the majority of the Swiss cantons and the people
of Switzerland to integrate the Canton of Jura as a new federal
and constitutional unit within the Confederation.
2. Decisions did not follow the simple-majority principle ("the
winner takes all"). They took into account even majorities of
small municipalities, which were de facto granted the status of a
state unit, as they had the power to decide which canton they
wanted to belong to.
3. It was considered to be part of the constitutional autonomy of
the Canton of Berne to provide in its own cantonal constitution
a democratic procedure that could implement a peaceful
settlement of the right to self-determination for a region within
the territorial sovereignty of the canton.
4. The entire procedure was influenced by the necessity that in
such crucial decisions, even small minorities belonging to a
municipality must be part of the consensus-making process.
Based on this democratic procedure, Switzerland finally amended its
federal Constitution by providing that the Canton of Jura should in 1979
be constituted as a canton within the Confederation and that it would be
the twenty-sixth constituent canton of the Confederation (Article 1 in fine).
This democratic and finally peaceful secession procedure was the model
for a new provision in the new Constitution regarding territorial changes.23
Article 53 provides that any modification of the number of the cantons or
of their status is subject to the assent of the population concerned, of the
cantons concerned, and of the Swiss people and of the cantons at large.
Thus, the new Constitution regulates the democratic procedure for secession
or reunion.
In neither case can it be a unilateral decision. Secession or reunion
requires the consensus first of the seceding or uniting population and,
wBasta Fleiner, "Minority and Legitimacy of a Federal State: An Outsider Perception of the Swiss
Model," p. 90; Hafelin and Haller, Schweizerisches Bundesslaalsrecht, p. 285.
23See Jaag, "Die Rechtsstellung der Kantone in der Bundesverfassung," p. 476; Hafelin and Haller,
Schweizerisches Bundessiaatsrechl, pp. 565-577.
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second, of the entire population of the country and the majority of the
cantons. The procedure seems to take both minority interests and majority
interests into account. One can say, then, that as of 2001, the Ethiopian
Constitution24 and the Swiss Constitution are the only constitutions in the
world that explicitly regulate secession procedures.
Paragraph 3 of Article 53 even provides a procedure for changes of
territory without modification of the number of the cantons. In such
territorial modifications, the proposals are subject to the assent of the
population concerned, of the cantons concerned, and of the federal
Parliament. As there is still dispute within the Canton of Berne with regard
to its Protestant French-speaking region in the Jura, which generally did
not want to join the new French-speaking but Catholic canton, that region
might still decide in the future according to this procedure whether it prefers
to join the new Canton of Jura.
Switzerland of the nineteenth century was internally very fragile and
externally under threat from neighboring monarchies. This potential
instability was the reason the Constitution of 1874 prohibited groups of
cantons from constituting political alliances, which could endanger the unity
of Switzerland. 25 The new Constitution renounces any such prohibition
because there is no longer any real threat to the unity of the country. This
may be a case proving that over time, democratic constitutions can very
well provide institutions and procedures that integrate and strengthen the
legitimacy of the state.
FEDERALISM AND DEMOCRACY
The Tyranny of the Majority. Is democracy limited by federalism; does
federalism violate the democratic principle of majority rule? Does it even
replace democracy by granting minorities rights they would never receive
in a system based on a "winner takes all" democracy? Democracy is based
on the principle of one person, one vote, one value.26 Such equal rights
can only be achieved and implemented in the democracy of a unitary state.
In such a centralized state, minorities have no possibility for an autonomous
rule, opting out from majority decisions, or participating (shared rule) in
the central decision-making process with any chance of defending their
legitimate interests against the majority. Equality in the sense of completely
equal rights is the main target of such a democracy, as developed out of the
French Revolution and of the Westminster-model.27
24See Ahmednasir M. Abdullahi, "Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution on Secession and Self-
Determination: A Panacea to the Nationality Question in Africa?" Verfassungen und Recht in Ubersee. I^aw
and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998), p. 440.
KSee art. 7 (Constitution 1874).
26See Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1987), passim;
Basta Fleiner, "Minority and Legitimacy of a Federal State: An Outsider Perception of the Swiss Model," p.
94, suggests in p. 95 that in Switzerland, "federalism has been introduced as a structural principle of democracy."
^See Alexis De Tocqueville, De la Democracie en Amerique, Oeuvres completes II (Paris: Pleiade, 1992),
part II, chapter 7: "De 1'omnipotence de la majorite aux Etats-Unis et de ses effets," and chapter 8, "De ce
qui tempere aux Etats-Unis la tyrannie de la majorite."
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This understanding of democracy as a pure and efficient majority-
producing instrument does not correspond to the Swiss perception of
democracy. In Switzerland, democracy is perceived as a tool of individual
and collective self-determination and, thus, of individual and collective
freedom. If self-determination cannot be achieved individually, it has to be
achieved democratically within a community. In smaller communities, the
chances for every participant to pursue his or her interests as much as
possible are higher than in larger communities. The smaller the democratic
unit, the higher are the possibilities of self-determination for each group-
member. If democracy is understood as an aim to guarantee individual
and/or collective self-determination, it can only be optimized in a
decentralized and federal way. Only federalism, conceived as a state
organizational principle, can allow the decentralization of decision-making
to small genuinely autonomous collectivities, which can also participate
through the shared power principle in the decision-making process at the
central level. According to the Swiss view, federalism and democracy have
to be seen as complementary to ensure freedom and self-determination.
Federalism, understood from this point of view, is even the necessary
condition for the establishment of a consensus-driven democracy. Without
federalism, democracy will erode and vice versa. Thus, the consensus-driven
democracy in Switzerland is essentially linked to Swiss federalism.
Consensus-Driven Democracy. Democracy is not only a procedure to establish
a legitimate government but also a procedure to ensure peaceful settlements
of conflicts, in particular the conflicts of a state fragmented by different
ethnic communities. It has high legitimacy based on rational arguments
and pragmatic compromises among conflicting interests. The real motor
for this consensus-driven democracy in Switzerland is the Swiss system of
direct democracy. In the case of legislative referendums, decisions taken
by the legislature are ratified by the simple majority of voters. Constitutional
amendments need, in addition to the majority of the voters, majorities in a
majority of the cantons.
The legislative referendum seems to exclude any consensus, as every
simple majority can decide. However, reality is different. Government
proposals are usually rejected in a referendum when they lack a fundamental
consensus among the political elite and the big parties. Thus, the political
elite is forced to seek compromises if it needs the approval of the majority
of the voters. On the other side, no party has a veto power. Generally, in
practice, where one party has misused its position in the process, its position
has usually been rejected in the referendum.
This consensus-driven democracy is one of the basic pillars of the Swiss
state based on the notion of the composed nation. The Westminster-type
democracy would condemn any minority to be a permanent loser. Only in
a system that has as a target of the decision-making process achieving the
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highest majority possible, not just 51 percent, do minorities have a chance
not only to be protected as a folklore minority but also to get their legitimate
interests accepted by the majority. Thus, a consensus-driven democracy
enables legitimization of policy with regard to minorities.
Permanent losers will never identify with the state they live in. They will
always feel themselves to be second-class citizens. Thus, a multicultural
state can only survive if it introduces a democratic system that has as its
target a consensus in which minorities participate, and not just a simple
majority.
In a multicultural state, in which cultures should flourish and develop
and in which they should not be assimilated and "equalized" in a melting
pot, each cultural community must have the possibility to identify with the
state. Such a result is only possible if those decisions that have essential and
fundamental consequences for the state are supported by a large consensus,
including the great bulk of the different communities.
Apart from the system of direct democracy, the principle of shared powers
established by the Constitution also limits the simple-majority principle.
Shared power principles are provided through the second chamber, which
has been constituted like the U.S. Senate with 46 members representing
the 23 full cantons in the state council: two per canton for the 20 full cantons
and one for each of the six half-cantons (Article 150). Shared rule is not
only implemented through the second chamber. Just as important is the
power of the cantons to participate as cantons in all constitutional
referendums. According to the Constitution, any constitutional amendment
needs to be ratified by the majority of the voting citizens in the federation
and the majority of the voters in a majority of the cantons (Article 140, par.
1, lit. a), which, as already mentioned, differ to a large extent in size and
population. An indirect effect on the shared power system in Switzerland
has to be seen in the electoral system. Given that the cantons are the
constituencies for the members of the first chamber, the cantonal parties
decide on the candidates for election to the federal Parliament. This system,
including the principle of a fixed term collegial executive, avoids too much
political influence of federal (central) politics within cantonal voting (as
occurs in Germany). On the contrary, it gives cantons, through their parties,
an additional opportunity to influence federal policies. These
constitutionally provided rules of shared power have not been changed
with the new Constitution.
Enlarged Shared Power. In general terms, the new Constitution has enlarged
the possibilities for shared power and diminished the scope of self-rule,
that is, the autonomy of the cantons. As international cooperation, in
particular integration into the European Union, will have a great impact
on Swiss federalism, the new Constitution contains an increased number of
provisions that take into account international cooperation. This
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cooperation is not limited to the federal government. Article 55 provides
that cantons have to participate in all decision-making processes with regard
to international cooperation. A specific statute already regulates the
participation of the cantonal governments in matters of foreign policy.
In addition, Article 45 provides that cantons shall participate in decision-
making at the federal level and, in particular, in legislation, where it is
provided by the Constitution. This provision also obliges the federal
government to inform cantons of important policies being planned by the
federal government.
The new Constitution thus contains important provisions to enlarge the
scope of shared power. Historically, the founding fathers of the Constitution
defended the equal sovereign rights of the cantons sharing federal power on
the bases of the quality of sovereignty they had conveyed to the federal
government by the federal Constitution. In quantity, those sovereign rights
may be different but they do not differ in quality. Thus, the Constitution
implemented two principles of representation: representation of the people
based on one person, one vote, and one value in the first chamber, and
representation of the peoples of the cantons based on two representatives for
each sovereign canton, and one representative for each sovereign half-canton.
The new provisions of the Constitution do not limit shared power to the
liberal principle of the people's representation in parliament. It enlarges
the shared power process to include empowering cantonal governments.
Thus, generally, the new Constitution opens a new concept of federalism
incorporating the executive branches of government. In the future, cantons
will have the right to a role in the exercise of the shared power based on the
principle of representation through their citizens as voters and through
the participation of their executive branches of government.
Democracy of Municipalities. Diversity and multiculturalism are not limited
or identical with the territories of the cantons but in several cases with the
territories of the municipalities. Multiculturalism with regard to religion
and to language is often determined by municipal boundaries. This is the
very reason why federalism in Switzerland cannot be reduced to the
relationship between cantons and federal government. It has to incorporate
also the local democracies of the municipalities. The small democracy in
the local municipal area is the fundamental element of Swiss federalism.
Contrary to most nation-states, which, by the historic tradition of the
monarchies, have been developed "top-down," Switzerland is one of the
very few countries that has been developed "bottom-up." The municipal
democracies are the units at the bottom of the state, which guarantee and
foster the diversity of Switzerland.28
^See Hansjorg Seiler, "Gemeinden im schweizerischen Staatsrecht," Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, eds.
Aubert, Muller, and Thurer, pp. 491-506; Erich Bapst, "The Autonomy of Swiss Communes: A Pleading.
Federalism without Autonomous Communes? Impossible!" Federalism and Multiethnic States, eds. Basta
Fleiner and Fleiner, p. 213.
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This corporate democracy is an essential element in the perception of
democracy and federalism. The Swiss citizen is a citizen of the municipality,
of the canton, and of the Confederation. Each taxpayer pays taxes to the
municipality, to the Canton, and to the federal government. The municipality
takes care of the daily necessities of citizens, and through the system of direct
democracy, it controls financial expenditures, elects local parliaments as well
as the members of the executive council, decides on taxes, engages in local
planning, and so on. The municipality is the arena in which self-
determination is implemented directly. According to the Swiss understanding
of federalism, the federal structure of the country has to ensure local
democracy as an essential part of self-determination and conflict settlement.
According to the self-rule principle, the structure, organization, and
autonomy of municipalities are subject to cantonal law. This was the reason
why the autonomy of municipalities was not even mentioned in the old
Constitution. The new Constitution (Article 50) provides a special section
for the protection of municipalities. It guarantees their autonomy according
to cantonal law and obliges the federal government to evaluate all federal
measures that might have consequences for the municipalities. Economic
development and, in particular, the side-effects of globalization, the
complexity of the welfare state, and the principle of executive federalism
particularly overburden small municipalities (less than 500 inhabitants) with
tasks they cannot cope with anymore. Cantons are, therefore, confronted
with the need to facilitate or even to enforce the merger of small
municipalities that do not possess the necessary means in terms of their
human and financial capital to fulfill their basic obligations. Such mergers
of municipalities are regulated by cantonal law, which in most cases requires
a referendum of the population concerned. As in any merger, at least one
part of the population will lose the name and, therefore, the identity with
its historic commune. Hence, citizens often prefer to pay a higher price in
taxes than to give up their home community and merge with another
municipality.
EQUAL LIVING CONDITIONS
Article 72, par. 2, of the German constitution provides federal legislative
competence if it is necessary for the establishment of equal living conditions
throughout the country.29 A similar provision is to be found in Article 130
of the Spanish Constitution, which provides that the "public authorities
shall attend to the modernization and development of all economic sectors,
particularly of agriculture, livestock raising, fishing, and handicrafts, in order
to equalize the standard of living of all Spaniards."
his article was originally drafted to limit the legislative competencies of the federation; in practice
it became the very provision for the creation of unitary law cp. the German Supreme Court case law:
BVerfGE 18. 415; 26, 383; BVerfGE 4, 127; 26, 383; 78, 270 .
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Modern constitutions generally require equal rights with regard to equal
opportunities, not equal results.30 Neither equal opportunities nor equal
results, however, are guaranteed according to the Swiss Constitution. Swiss
federalism does not promote equality of living conditions among the cantons.
Diversity and autonomy are only possible if human beings pay the price of
economic discrimination among different cantons and even different
municipalities. Swiss federalism has always paid this price for the sake of the
fiscal autonomy of the cantons. Equalization would mean centralization,
and this, it is believed, would destroy diversity. With the possible integration
in the European Union, which promotes an open market based on equal
opportunities, Switzerland may have to face a new stage of federalism. Thus,
the federal Parliament has already put into force a law guaranteeing equal
opportunities with regard to the internal market in Switzerland. This law
requires quite a number of cantonal legislative modifications in order for
them to give up internal cantonal discrimination. However, according to
evaluations (Art. 170) of the federal Parliament, most cantons have not
followed these federal obligations. This example shows how difficult it will
be even within Switzerland to establish equal opportunities in reality.31
In a state with a fragmented society, solidarity is not only an issue between
individuals but also between different cultural communities and religions.
Thus, solidarity as a basic element holding the potential conflicting society
in Switzerland together has to provide equal opportunities not only for
individuals but also for communities. Equality of community may often
even have priority over equality of individuals. This may be the very reason
why the old constitution did not, and the new Constitution still does not,
have any provision guaranteeing equal opportunities among individuals or
equal living conditions for the whole population. It gives equal rights and
the "right to be equal" as part of a minority community the same value.
The understanding of equal rights has accordingly two different
meanings: the right to "be equal" and the right to "equal rights." If persons
belonging to the Romansh minority have only equal rights, they will always
be considered or will consider themselves as second-class citizens. In a
totally equal society, they remain a tiny minority, which feels de facto
discriminated in a state that reduces the citizen only to a political person
naked of any culture. If they have, however, the right to be equal, they
must be accepted on equal terms as being part of their cultural community.
A Romansh-speaking citizen needs to have the same value as part of his or
her communityjust in the same way as persons belonging to the majority of
the German-speaking community. It is obvious that Switzerland is seeking
a balance between equal individual rights and the right to be respected as
equal although belonging to a minority.
MSee Karl Hesse, Der unitarische Bundesstaat (Karlsruhe: CF Muller, 1962), and Heidrum Abromeit, Der
verkappte Einheitsstaat (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1992).
"Thomas Fleiner, AllgemeineStaatslehre, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Springer, 1995), p. 181.
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This also has consequences with regard to inequalities of taxes among
cantons and municipalities. Thus, the new Constitution provides also only
a federal competence to harmonize the cantonal legislative systems of taxes
and the procedure of taxing among the different cantons (Article 129, par.
2). The amount of taxes, that is, the income per year, on the other hand is
decided either by a cantonal parliament or by popular cantonal referendum.
As a consequence, individuals with the same income have to pay considerably
different taxes depending on the municipality and canton in which they
have their domicile.
Some equalization is provided (Article 135).32 The system of fiscal
equalization has been under general discussion and will be fundamentally
modified.33 It will have a basic influence on Swiss federalism. The main
target is to give cantonal policy more autonomy by global grants to support
intercantonal cooperation, to give economically weak cantons more federal
resources, and to finance cantonal tasks, which because of their specific
circumstances, are particularly costly.
SWISS INSTITUTIONS AND STRUCTURE IN TERMS OF ITS
"FEDERALIST PHILOSOPHY"
Cantonal Autonomy and Self-Rule
Cantonal Sovereignty. In the European perception of law, the state is the
Leviathan as set forth in to the social compact theory of Thomas Hobbes.
Sovereignty is perceived as arising from a "Big Bang," out of which emerged
the legal system, the state, the constitution-making power, legitimacy, and
courtjurisdiction. This supreme power and jurisdiction cannot be divided.
Competence belongs ultimately either to the federation or to the cantons.
If it belongs to the federation, the cantons cannot be states. A state without
sovereignty cannot exist; states and sovereignty are indivisible.34 Those who
still advocate this theory35 of absolute sovereignty cannot accept the idea of
a division of sovereign powers.36 Although sovereignty is not divisible in
such theory, the old and the new Swiss constitutions have claimed that the
cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the federal
Constitution (Article 3). The residual power remains with the cantons, which,
as sovereign units, handed over partial sovereignty to the Confederation.
MSee also Article 46 par. 3; 83 par. 3; 86 par. 3 (e); 128 par.4.
33See Hans Maeder and Kuno Schedler, eds., Perspektiven desFinanzausgieichs in derSchweiz (Bern: 1996);
Franz Eng et al., eds., Neuer Finanzausgleich zwischen Bund und Kantonen: Die Ausvrirkung aufdie Gemeinden
(Bern: 1997); Markus Fuchs, Das Instrument Finanzausgleich • dargestelll unter besonderer Berucksichtigung des
indirekten Finanzausgieichs zwischen dem Kanton Luzern und seinen Einwohnergemeinden (diss., Fribourg
University, Luzern 1987). Links: http://www.efd.admin.ch/d/aktuell/nfa, 9July 2002, http://coc.idl.unisg.ch/
, 9 July 2002.
^Saladin, "Commentary ad Article 3 (Constitution 1874)," p. 18.
^For a thorough analysis see Max Imboden, "Die staatsrechdiche Problematik des schweizerischen
Foderalismus," Staat undRechl, AusgewdhlteSchriften und Vortrdge, ed. Max Imboden (Basel/Stuttgart, 1971),
p. 175.
' 'Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Papers, Nr. 33.
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Although cantonal sovereignty is limited, cantons dispose of all the
traditional state powers. They sustain all three branches of government:
legislative, executive, and judicial. They also have substantial but limited
constitutional powers and even a treaty-making power (Article 56). They
decide on their own democratic system and determine the exercise of power
in their system of direct democracy. They also decide on their own structure
of internal decentralization, including the powers of local authorities. Much
more important is the legitimacy of state government. This legitimacy does
not depend on the federal legitimacy but on the peoples of the canton.
Cantons do not derive their legitimacy from the federal government; their
power structure is, and has to be, legitimized by their own people. Thus,
the legitimacy of the federal and cantonal powers in Switzerland depends
on different constituencies. The people, who are sovereign (Article 148,
par. 1), give legitimacy to the state power. In Switzerland, depending on its
factual diversity, the constituencies, which provide legitimacy, are divided
by the federal and cantonal sovereigns."
Are Cantons "States?" This question is related to the European
understanding of the "state" as a collective unit conceived as the fountain
of justice and law. It is related to the European theory of the state, which
was developed in parallel to the building of the European nation-states in
the nineteenth century. The question of whether cantons have to be
considered as states has concrete consequences with regard to international
law. International law still considers states as units and as only subject to
international law. However, in strongly decentralized federal states, the
constitutional units of the federation may also participate in international
decisions and specially in international treaty-making. International law
neglects this fact and denies to constitutional units of federal states a role
as parties before international courts. Thus, if Switzerland were to join the
European Union, cantons could never sue or be sued before the European
Court, although there might be cases in which the responsibility to apply
European law lies with the cantons and not with the federation.
As states, the cantons adopt their own constitutions. They have the
limited but still undisputed constitution-making power. The preamble to
the Constitution of the Canton of Jura, for instance, invokes the French
Declaration of Human Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and the European Convention on Human Rights. The powers of the
governmental branches are not derived from the federal Constitution or
federal law; they depend for their legitimacy on the people of the canton.
If federalism is a response to multiculturalism, the cantons as the basic
holders of cultural communities have a legitimacy that is not derived from
any other unit than from their own people, the very constituency of the
canton.
"See also Saladin, "Commentary ad Article 3 (Constitution 1874)," pp. 19-20.
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Autonomy and Division of Powers. According to Article 3 of die Constitution,38
all the powers of the federal government have to be spelled out in the federal
Constitution. As the cantons have the residual and original power, their
competencies are not comprehensively articulated in the federal Constitution.
According to several cantonal constitutions, the residual power has even
remained at the municipal level. According to the federal Constitution of
1874, the federal government could only claim competencies by interpreting
the relevant articles of the Constitution. This has changed somewhat with
the new Constitution. According to Article 42, par. 2, the Confederation
shall assume tasks that require uniform regulation. This article could be
given a very broad interpretation. If this were to be the case, the federal
legislature would in effect decide which competencies are needed for
necessary uniform regulations. All these articles were originally drafted with
the idea that the new Constitution would, contrary to the old Constitution,
provide a constitutional review of all statutes. This "revolutionary" proposal
did not get the approval of Parliament, however. Thus, it will only be in the
jurisdiction of the federal legislature to decide to what extent Article 42, par.
2, can be used for federal competencies without explicit constitutional
provision. The question arises, will it have the same centralizing impact in
the future as the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution?
With regard to the actual distribution of powers between the
Confederation and the cantons, the new Constitution does not contain any
important changes. One of the main aims of the new Constitution was to
give the actual system a modernized wording, but to avoid any significant
amendments that would dramatically change the balance of powers in
Switzerland.
Federal Standards and Principles. Swiss Federalism has followed the tradition
of all federal states in Europe, including the "executive federalism" of the
European Union. These federal states provide as a major policy the
implementation of federal law by the agencies of the member governments.
There are usually no federal agencies dealing directly with the
implementation of federal law. This is the responsibility of the cantons. Thus,
all federal statutes and ordinances are in general first interpreted and applied
by cantonal administrations and controlled by cantonal administrative courts,
depending on cantonal administrative procedure. This type of federalism
has been called "executive federalism" (Vollzugsjoderalismus).s9 This very
principle of executive federalism is for the first time now explicitly provided
for in Article 46 of the new Constitution. Executive federalism is based on a
hierarchical relationship between the cantons and the federal government
in all matters of federal competencies.
MSee also art. 42, par. 1, Constitution. Fora thorough analysis of the distribution of powers see Blaise
Knapp, "La repartition des competences et la cooperation de la Confederation et des cantons,"
Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, eds. Aubert, Muller, and Thiirer, pp. 457-472.
"'Peter Saladin, "Rahmengesetzgebung im Bundesstaai," Die Kunst der Verfassungserneuerung (Basle/
Frankfurt: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1988), p. 189.
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Taking this context into account, the federal authorities are attempting
to establish a new policy with regard to cantonal administration. They want
to leave detailed regulations to the cantonal legislature and to restrict
themselves to policymaking, to issuing federal standards and principles,
and to empowering the cantons to implement those principles within their
own legislation. Consequently, the competencies given to the Confederation
in the Constitution have generally been restricted to legislative powers.
Implementation of these statutes is part of the residual power of the cantons.
This policy has not changed under the new Constitution. In fact, the cantons
have had long experience in dealing directly with their citizens. If federal
agents were to attempt to implement federal law in the cantons, the
resistance of the population toward unknown federal agents coming from
different ethnic communities would almost certainly arouse indignation.
PARTICIPATION OF CANTONS IN THE DECISION-MAKING
PROCESSES OF FEDERAL AUTHORITIES
Self-rule and Shared Rule. According to the constitutions of 1848 and 1874,
the autonomy of the cantons had clear priority. However, since 1874, as a
result of approximately 140 constitutional amendments, the originally
extensive powers of the cantons have shifted slowly to the federal
government. This process of centralization diminished cantonal autonomy
gradually. As already mentioned, the new Constitution provides a general
provision, which can be interpreted as a general clause like the principle of
subsidiarity, but in this case diminishing cantonal autonomy by action of
the federal legislative majority, as well as a more difficult procedure for
constitutional amendments. A new constitutional amendment now also
provides for federal competencies in the field of court procedural rules.
This will have an important centralizing impact on the entire judiciary.
The challenge of the European Union will also have centralizing effects
on Swiss federalism. This may have been the most important reason why
the new Constitution focuses much more on the issues of shared rule than
on self-rule.40 In this sense, Swiss federalism has been more and more
influenced by the German tradition. Three major changes have to be
mentioned in this context. The first two are obvious: the right of cantons
to participate in the foreign policy decisions of the federal government
and the general right to participate in internal federal legislation. Third,
the general possibility for cantons to regulate matters of general concern
through international or intercantonal treaties has to be mentioned.
Partnership between cantons and between cantons and the federal
government, as well as partnership with neighboring European regions,
are probably the most interesting issues.
"See also Peler Hanni, Schuieizerischer Foderalismus und eumpaische Integration (Zurich: Schulthess, 2000),
pp. 388-389.
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Council of States and Executive Federalism. The strengthening of the shared
rule principle has not led, as one might have expected, to a strengthening
and widening of the powers of the second chamber. It has been
implemented instead by strengthening the possibilities for cantonal
executive bodies to participate in the decision-making processes of the
federal government. In order to participate in the federal decision-making
processes, cantonal executives have had to create a new body, which
represents all the cantonal governments. Thus, the widening of the shared
rule principle at the federal level has had as a direct consequence the
establishment of the Council of Presidents of cantonal governments.41 This
has led to better cooperation between cantonal governments as such. This
development also has enabled the cantons to use new ways and tools for
cantonal and intercantonal partnership cooperation. The creativity of this
cooperative federalism is new, and may lead Switzerland to greater flexibility.
In the field of universities, the legislature has established a body composed
of representatives of cantonal governments and of the federal council, whose
task is to plan and establish strategies for developing federal and cantonal
universities. With this new "superstructure" combining shared rule and
self-rule in the field of higher education, Switzerland is trying to meet the
new challenge of a "European Space of Higher Education" proclaimed in
the Bologna-Declaration of 1999. There are also new tendencies that might
even lead to supracantonal cooperation on regional bases of collaboration.
This is already at least a partial reality in the field of professional education.
There is discussion not only of direct partnership of executive bodies but
also of cantonal parliaments. It may well be that this new flexibility of
intercantonal cooperation will lead to the establishment of real intercantonal
bodies with specific democratic legitimacy based on the citizens and united
by a functional focus such as a school, hospital, or police region.
Thus, Swiss federalism will face new administrative bodies, new distinct
regional parliaments, and new executive branches all united to fulfill specific
tasks in order to have more efficiency. Federalism involving shared power
in representative bodes will be supplemented by a shared power system of
executive and administrative bodies. It seems clear, then, that the new
Constitution does not restrict federalism only to the legislative branch and
to representative bodies, but enlarges federalism to encompass the executive
branches.
PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN CONFEDERATION AND CANTONS
Solidarity. Several years ago, the Canton of Basle introduced in its
constitution a provision that imposed upon the cantonal authorities the
responsibility to fight with all legal means proposals for any nuclear power
plant that threatened to endanger the population of the canton. As cantonal
*'See Kurt N'uspliger, "Grundziige der Behordenstruktur im Verfassungsrecht der Kantone,"
Verfassungsrecht der Schzueiz, eds. Aubert, Muller, and Thiirer, pp. 1093-1094.
Swiss Federalism 119
constitutions have to be approved by the federal Parliament, the question
arose as to whether such a cantonal constitutional provision, which may be
contrary to the general interest of the Swiss population's dependence on
atomic energy, would be acceptable. Parliament did approve the
amendment with the argument that under the cantonal provision,
authorities are only obliged to use legal and not illegal means in their
struggle against nuclear power plants.
At almost the same time, Parliament had to approve the constitution of
the Canton ofjura. This new canton provided in its constitution a provision
to politically encourage the remaining Protestant but French-speaking
neighboring minority of the Canton of Berne to secede from that canton
and tojoin the new Canton ofjura. This article was considered a provision
that would stir up secessionist conflict in the neighboring Canton of Berne.
The federal Parliament did not approve the article, even though the
provision did not extend to the new cantonal authorities of the Jura using
illegal means.
The issue in both cases was solidarity. In the Basle case, it has been
considered that solidarity was not violated. In the Jura case, the federal
Parliament was of the opinion that the constitutional obligation to foster
the secession of a region in a neighboring canton violates the principle of
federal solidarity. The very issue with regard to solidarity is this: what
solidarity can the majority reasonably and legitimately expect from the
minorities, and what solidarity is necessary from the majority in order to
have legitimacy with regard to the minorities?
A federation (foedus, alliance) can only exist on the basis of the solidarity
of its partners. Partnership is indispensable not only between the cantons
but also between the federal branches of government and cantonal branches
of government. Without such solidarity, the Confederation cannot exist.
This is the philosophy behind Article 44 of the new Constitution, which
reads as follows:
1. The Confederation and the Cantons shall collaborate, and shall
support each other in the fulfillment of their tasks.
2. They owe each other mutual consideration and support. They
shall grant each other administrative and judicial assistance.
3. Disputes between Cantons, or between Cantons and the
Confederation shall, to the extent possible, be resolved through
negotiation or mediation.
In fact, federalism in such a small country as Switzerland is only possible
if the division of powers finds its complementary balance in a network of
informal cooperation at all levels of government and administration,
including also labor unions and business, the so-called "social partners."
This network might often not be very transparent because it is informal,
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but it is this comity of different partners that ultimately holds Switzerland
together. The complexity of state tasks and state obligations requires such
a cooperation not only among magistrates and elected authorities but also
among civil servants of federal and cantonal administrations. This is the
content of Article 44, par. I.42
Although this provision was not part of the old formal tradition, its content
was in fact the living reality. Without this reality, such a provision would
remain only on paper. However, because it has been written on the basis of
long-lasting political experience, it is only the formal and legal ratification
of an attitude which is a historic reality.
The explicit obligation to solidarity is to be found in paragraph 2 of this
article. This is not limited to an obligation of loyalty, as is the case according
to the German constitution for the German Lander. It is an obligation to
solidarity that goes beyond loyalty in the sense that it is less hierarchical
and more driven by partnership. If partners, in particular those representing
the majority, are not prepared to sacrifice some of their interests for the
sake of the whole unity, federalism will sooner or later break into pieces.43
Supremacy of Federal Law. Not all federal states have clear provisions to
guarantee the supremacy of federal law.44 The Swiss Constitution has since
the beginning of the Confederation followed the American model of the
supremacy clause.45 According to the European continental law systems,
the "law" must be a unity in which different bills, statutes, and ordinances
of federal, cantonal, and municipal governments are integrated into a clear
hierarchy. This is today apparent in the German constitution46 as well as
for the European Union.47 Security of law, and in particular, equal
protection can only be guaranteed on the basis of the principle of the
supremacy clause.
In the old Constitution, the supremacy clause was hidden in the provisions
regulating the transition. The new Constitution determines it clearly in
Article 49: "Federal law takes precedence over contrary cantonal law. The
Confederation shall ensure that the Cantons respect federal law." The
Constitution thus implements Hans Kelsen's philosophy of the hierarchy
of law.48
Constitutional Review and Rule of Law. Switzerland belongs to those states
which had introduced constitutional review already in the nineteenth
42For the cooperative federalism, see Christian Dominice, "Federalisme cooperatif," Zeitschrift fur
Schweizerisches Rechl (1969): 743; Ulrich Hafelin, "Der Kooperative Foderalismus in derSchweiz," Zeitschrift
furSchweizerisches Rechl (1969): 549; Peter Saladin, "Bund und Kanlone," Zeitschrift fur Schweizerisches Recht
(1984): 590.
"On the loyalty issue (Bundestreue), see Alfred Kolz, "Bundestreue als Verfassungsprinzip?"
Schweizerisches Zentralblattfur Staats- und Verwaltungsrechi (1980): 145;Jaag, "Die Rechtsstellung der Kantone
in der Bundesverfassung," pp. 482-483.
11This constitutional right is now explicitly provided in Article 49 par.l Constitution.
"See Article VI par. 2 of the US-Constitution.
46Article 31 German Fundamental Ijaw.
<7See European Court ofjustice 1964, p. 1251-RS 6/64 (Cosla/ENEL) esp. N 9-13.
4SHans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (Oxford University Press, 1991), passim. See also Thomas Fleiner,
"Comparative Constitutional and Administrative Law," in: 75 Tul. L. Rev. 929 (2001): 932-933.
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century. This constitutional review, however, was limited to the review of
cantonal statutes by the federal Court. It is true that at that time, the federal
system could only function when citizens were able to defend their
constitutional rights against the cantonal legislature before a federal court.49
Thus, the Constitution of 1848 provided a very limited possibility for the
citizens to sue their canton before the federal Court and to defend their
constitutional rights against violations by cantonal authorities. This
constitutional protection was indispensable. The power to defend
constitutional rights against cantonal authorities is also provided for in the
new Constitution.50
However, although there have been many initiatives in Swiss history to
introduce also the possibility of constitutional review of federal statutes,
Parliament has ultimately rejected all those proposals. The majority of the
Swiss are still too much committed to the idea of Jean Jacques Rousseau
and his volonte generate, the notion that bills and statutes are not only written
law but also the very implementation of justice, which cannot be nullified
by a court.51 In their view, the legislature is the highest representative of
the nation and therefore issues the volonte generate, which cannot be
questioned for any constitutional reasons whatever. As all statutes passed
by Parliament are subject to an optional referendum (Article 141), they are
considered to be ratified either silently by the people, when they do not
invoke the right of referendum, or explicitly because they have been
approved in a referendum by the majority of the people.
Accordingly, there is no judicial body that would have the legitimacy to
put into question what has been tacitly or explicitly ratified by the sovereign
legislature. This argument has proved, even today, to be more convincing
to the public against the traditional common-law argument that men should
be governed by law and not by men. As a consequence, the cantons have
nojudicial channel to defend their autonomy against infringements by the
federal legislature. Thus, constitutional review has remained a one-way
road, providing protection against cantonal violations but not against
violations by the federal legislature.
New Federal Responsibilities of the Confederation. Diversity and autonomy
have been guaranteed up to now by the clear constitutional restriction of
the federal powers. Direct democracy, the guarantee of cantonal autonomy
in the Constitution, and a political climate defending federalism have been
the real guarantees of Swiss multiculturalism. These instruments have been
developed for the settlement of conflicts and for the defense of minority
interests. The new Constitution includes specific obligations to care for,
support, and sustain federalism, diversity, solidarity, and comity.52 The
*
9See Walter Kalin, "Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," Verfassungsrecht derSchweiz, eds. Aubert, Miiller, and
Thurer, pp. 1167-1181; Fleiner, "Cantonal and Federal Administration," Francois Dessemontel, Tugrul
Ansay, Introduction to Swiss Law, 2nd ed. (The Hague: Kluwer/Schulthess, 1995), pp. 31-33.
^Article 189 par. 1 (a) Constitution.
5lSee Benjamin Barber, "How Swiss is Rousseau?" Political Theory 13 (1985): 485.
MSee Preamble, Article 2, 69, par. 3 and 71, par. 2 Constitution.
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federal government has to foster languages, to care for mutual
understanding, to guarantee peace among religious communities, and to
support poor regions, big cities, and mountain areas. The Confederation
has, with regard to its legislation and administration, to take cantonal
particularities into account and, at the same time, to provide the largest
possible autonomy to the cantons (Article 46, par. 2). The Confederation
has to respect cantonal independence and self-rule (Article 47), but it also
has to decide at which moment some federal regulations need to be issued
for the sake of uniformity (Article 42, par. 2).
Thus, the federal branches of government will have to assume new
responsibilities. They will need new tools to provide information in order
to plan and react according to their obligations. When they plan and decide
upon new legislation or administrative measures, they are constitutionally
obliged to make an assessment of the impact on federalism. However, they
will determine the scope of federalism that is good for Switzerland, a
responsibility they did not have to assume under the old Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Switzerland faces not only globalization, but also the fact that at the same
time markets seem to have become both global and more local. Local
nationalism, which one cannot calculate and foresee, is a challenge of even
greater importance for a federal country composed of multiple diversity.
Large and homogeneous nation-states are confronted with globalization.
Multicultural federal states also face "localization." Thus, they are
confronted with a double challenge. Globalization diminishes political
capacities and, in particular, the power of states to react politically and to
develop an independent political strategy within their territory. Emotional
localization, on the other hand, can only be coped with if the political units
display a high flexibility and the political capacity to find innovative answers
to the requirements of national communities.
Internationalization, however, offers to units within federations an
incredible opportunity to enlarge their political capacities and flexibility
through regional international partnerships. In particular, one has to
concede that for Switzerland through the European Union, the cooperation
of cultural communities with their neighbor states will broaden and
strengthen their self-consciousness toward the federal government. The
growing international network between small communities will open new
chances for partnership, cultural development, and cooperation. The
federal government, in turn, is likely to be less confronted with emotional
localization if the constitutional units through their international
cooperation are able to feel more self-confident with regard to their
opportunities for cultural partnership.
As for the shared rule, a federal order can only exist if there is at least a
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minimal consensus with regard to the basic values which the great bulk of
society accepts throughout all its different cultural diversities. Therefore,
cantonal constitutions must contain some basic shared values, which are
generally accepted and thus approved by the federal Parliament. (Article
51, par 1).
If those shared values are not cultural, and in a multicultural society that
cannot be the case, they must be political. If they are political, they ought
to be universal and therefore acceptable for every human being. The Swiss
values are certainly political, but one cannot claim that values such as direct
democracy are universal. Thus, the basis of Swiss unity has to be found in
political values that are widely accepted by the citizens of Swiss society. For
any human being integrated in the Swiss tradition, these values are generally
acceptable and inclusive; for people not familiar with the democratic
tradition of the cantons and the Confederation, they are exclusive. Thus,
based on political values such as federalism and direct democracy, a specific
political culture has been established that seems to hold the fragmented
nation together.
Those who consider federalism as a basic value for a polity have to be
aware that federalism in history has been one of the most dynamic and
flexible but also fragile structures for state order. Contrary to unitary systems,
federalism can by formed and developed in great diversity. Shared rule
and self-rule can be strengthened, broadened, weakened, or restricted. Even
the principle of equal rights of federal subjects is not taboo. There are
important examples of asymmetric federal states.53 It is the existing diversity
of the society, its traditions, cultures and languages, and political values
(consumer democracy or citizen democracy) that determine the concrete
shape of a federal polity. Those pre-constitutional realities are the decisive
factors that influence a federal system and create or destroy its legitimacy.
This inherent openness and dynamism should enable federal systems to
join international organizations and to delegate part of their already limited
and divided sovereignty much better than inflexible unitary states. Thus,
federal systems should more easily adapt to the modern trends of
internationalization, European integration, and globalization.
For Switzerland, the very challenge will be whether it can transcend its
philosophy and its system of a multicultural society composed of traditional
communities to evolve into a system that is open not only to global capital
but also to global labor. Can federalism become a tool to integrate different
cultures immigrating into Switzerland? As in most European states,
Switzerland is also threatened by racism, which discriminates against
foreigners. Will it be able to face this challenge based on the tradition of
diversity and federalism?
MSee Ronald Watts, "The Theoretical and Practical Implications of Asymmetrical Federalism,"
Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States, ed. Robert Agranoff (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), p. 24.

